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Summary
Explaining cooperation is one of the greatest chal-
lenges for evolutionary biology [1–3]. It is particularly
a problem in species such as humans, where there is
cooperation between nonrelatives. Numerous possi-
ble solutions have been suggested for the problem
of cooperation between nonrelatives, including pun-
ishment, policing, and various forms of reciprocity
[3–14]. Here, we suggest that local competition for re-
sources can pose a problem for these hypotheses,
analogous to how it can select against cooperation
between relatives [15–21]. We extend the prisoner’s
dilemma (PD) game to show that local competition
between interacting individuals can reduce selection
for cooperation between nonrelatives. This is be-
cause, with local competition, fitness is relative to so-
cial partners, and cooperation benefits social part-
ners. We then test whether nonrelated humans
adjust their level of cooperation facultatively in re-
sponse to the scale of competition when playing the
PD for cash prizes. As predicted, we found that individ-
uals were less likely to cooperate when competition
was relatively local. Cooperation between humans
will therefore be most likely when repeated interac-
tions take place on a local scale between small num-
bers of people, and competition for resources takes
place on a more global scale among large numbers
of people.
Results
Incorporating Local Competition into the PD
In the PD game, two individuals interact with each other
and choose whether to cooperate or not cooperate (de-
fect or cheat) [22]. The payoffs assumed for different
strategies lead to the focal player doing better if they de-
fect, irrespective of whether the other player cooperates
*Correspondence: stu.west@ed.ac.ukor defects, but both parties defecting gives a lower pay-
off than if both had cooperated (Table 1). The dilemma is
that from a selfish perspective each will decide that the
best course is defect, thus making both worse off than if
they had both cooperated. The most famous solution to
this problem occurs when players interact a number of
times (multiple rounds), termed the iterated PD [22]. In
this case, cooperation can be favored by a ‘‘Tit-For-
Tat’’ (TFT) strategy, which is to cooperate in the first
round and in every subsequent round copy the partner’s
play from the previous round [22]. TFT is a strategy of
facultative (reciprocal) cooperation, which punishes
defectors by not cooperating with them.
We introduced the possibility of local competition for
resources into the PD (Supplemental Data available with
this article online). Specifically, we introduced a scale of
competition parameter, a, that denotes the proportion of
competition that occurs locally (i.e., at the level of the
pair of social partners engaged in an evolutionary
game) as opposed to globally (i.e., at the level of the
whole population). Our results showed that as competi-
tion became more local, cooperation was selected
against (Figure 1). Specifically, the expected number of
interactions between players (rounds per game), re-
quired for TFT to be stable against invasion by always
defect, increased with more local competition (higher
a). Higher numbers of interactions favor altruism be-
cause they allow greater opportunities for reciprocal al-
truism [4, 22].
As competition becomes more local, the payoff of the
focal individual relative to their partner becomes more
important. With global competition (a = 0), fitness is de-
termined by the classical payoff structure (absolute
values). However, as competition becomes more local,
the relative payoff becomes more important, and the ab-
solute payoff becomes less important. In the extreme,
with completely local competition (a = 1), the focal in-
dividual is competing only with their partner, and so
fitness is determined by how the focal individual does
relative to their partner. Cooperation never results in
an increase in relative payoff, whereas defection does
(Table 1). Consequently, the dilemma disappears, as
defection always leads to a higher payoff, and both
players cooperating does not lead to a higher payoff
than both players defecting (Table 1).
Testing with Humans
We then tested our model by examining whether nonre-
lated humans adjust their level of cooperation in re-
sponse to the scale of competition. We made students
play the PD game in groups of three. Each student
played each of the other two students for an unknown
number of repeated interactions (an average of seven
rounds). We varied the scale of competition by having
five groups play at a time (a class) and giving cash re-
wards to the top five scores in the class for relatively
global competition or the top score in each group for rel-
atively local competition. Each student played once with
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We found that students showed higher levels of coop-
eration when competition was relatively global than
when competition was relatively local (Figure 2). This re-
sult held irrespective of whether analysis was carried out
at the level of the individual (t = 7.34, n = 57, p < 0.0001;
52/57 individuals showed higher levels of cooperation
with relatively global competition), group (t = 7.80, n =
9, p < 0.0001; 9/9 groups), or class (t = 10.97, n = 4, p =
0.002; 4/4 classes). Overall, students were more than
twice as likely to cooperate with relatively global com-
petition (44% of the time) than they were with relatively
local competition (18%; Figure 2).
Discussion
Theoretical Explanations for Cooperation
We have shown that local competition for resources
between nonrelatives selects against cooperation
Table 1. The Payoffs for Player A with Different Strategies in the
Prisoner’s Dilemma
Player B
Cooperation Defection
Player A Cooperation R = 3 (1), rewards
for mutual
cooperation
S = 0 (0), sucker’s
payoff
Defection T = 5 (N),
temptation
to defect
P = 1 (1), punishment
for mutual defection
The dilemma is that defection always leads to a higher payoff (T > R
and P > S) but that both cooperating leads to a higher payoff than
both defecting (R > P). Exact values given are for illustration. Given
in parentheses are the relative payoffs, which is the payoff for player
A divided by the payoff for player B. Local competition leads to the
relative payoffs being the crucial score, in which case both cooper-
ating does not lead to a higher payoff than both defecting (R = P).
Figure 1. Local Competition Selects against Cooperation in the Iter-
ated PD
The threshold expected number of rounds per game (N*) required for
Tit-For-Tat (TFT) to be evolutionarily stable is a monotonically in-
creasing function of the scale of competition (a). Assuming the pay-
offs T = 5,R = 3,P = 1, and S = 0, then when competition is global (a =
0) TFT is stable when N* > 2, and this threshold increases to infinity
as competition becomes increasingly local (higher a).(Figure 1). As competition becomes more local, the fit-
ness of an individual becomes more dependent upon
how they do relative to the partners that they interact
and potentially cooperate with. In this case, cooperation
is selected against because it never leads to an increase
in payoff relative to the beneficiary of cooperation (Table
1). Another way of conceptualizing this is that local com-
petition leads to the increased fitness of the beneficiary
of altruism coming at the cost of the provider of the co-
operation and so selects against cooperation.
We used the framework provided by the PD, because
it is a commonly used tool for demonstrating the prob-
lem of cooperation between nonrelatives [4, 22], and be-
cause we were able to test these predictions experimen-
tally with humans. Several authors have argued that the
PD, and the ability of reciprocal altruism to solve the
problem of cooperation, require a large number of very
specific assumptions and are likely to be of limited im-
portance outside of humans [8, 23]. However, reciprocal
altruism is just one of many mechanisms that can pro-
vide a direct fitness benefit to cooperation—alternatives
include group augmentation, policing, sanctions, and
punishment [7–14, 24]. We suggest that the conse-
quences of local competition for these different mech-
anisms will depend upon how cooperation is favored.
Although local competition makes relative fitness more
important and, hence, selects against cooperation,
it can also increase the advantage of punishing or
spiteful behaviors [25, 26], which can be used to enforce
cooperation.
Our results also illustrate a problem that needs to be
solved in the theoretical literature. Several simulation
studies, based on the PD, have suggested that limited
dispersal favors cooperation [27, 28]. In contrast, analyt-
ical studies have suggested this will not necessarily be
true because limited dispersal can also increase local
competition. In the simplest case, the effect of increased
competition exactly negates any benefit of limited dis-
persal [17, 29]. More complex analytical models can be
constructed in which limited dispersal does not lead to
such an increase in local competition, and hence, coop-
eration can be favored, depending upon biological de-
tails [3, 16–19, 29–35]. This raises the question of what
Figure 2. Human Cooperation and the Scale of Competition
The mean proportion of cooperative decisions made by students
with respect to the scale of competition. Error bars are back-trans-
formed 95% confidence intervals with individual students as inde-
pendent data points. As predicted (see Figure 1), individuals were
less likely to cooperate when competition was relatively local.
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tion studies and allowed the benefits of limited dispersal
to outweigh the cost of increased competition.
Cooperation in Humans and Other Animals
Our results showed that humans were more likely to co-
operate in the PD when competition was more global.
This will happen when individuals tend to have repeated
interactions (with the potential for cooperation) with
a small number of other individuals (or within groups),
but competition for resources occurs with a larger num-
ber of people (or between groups). Humans are a useful
study organism for testing this hypothesis, as their cog-
nitive abilities could allow the scale of competition to be
assessed. In addition, determining the cognitive tools
involved in cooperation between humans is key to re-
solving the debate over how the data from experimental
games are to be interpreted [36–39]. We suspect that
with most other organisms individuals will not be able
to assess variation in the scale of competition, and so
the response will be evolutionary rather than behavioral
(i.e., fixed not facultative) [20, 21].
An implication of our results is that if the perceived
scale of competition is manipulated, then this will alter
the level of cooperation among humans. This could oc-
cur in numerous ways in all forms of society. One way is
to create a common enemy, who must be competed
against relatively globally. A famous example of this is
in Nineteen Eighty-Four, where The Party uses a poster
with a ‘‘monstrous figure of a Eurasian soldier’’ to unite
the proles into ‘‘one of their periodical frenzies of patriot-
ism’’ [40]. As Hamilton [15, 41] pointed out, the same
competitive issues that can favor cooperation within
groups, can also favor the evolution of hostility (or war)
between groups. An alternative possibility is to reward
local cooperation. For example companies (or any
form of institution) could provide productivity rewards
(or evaluations) to individuals that depend in part upon
the performance of the workers that interact with that in-
dividual, rather than just the performance of the individ-
ual or the company as a whole.
Experimental Procedures
We carried out the following experiment on four undergraduate clas-
ses, three containing 15 students and one containing 12 students.
Two of these classes were in 2004 and two were in 2005. This class
was prior to a course on social evolution theory, which means it was
before the students were taught relevant evolutionary biology. Each
class was split up into five groups of three students (four groups in
the class with 12 students). The PD was then explained to the stu-
dents, who were then allowed to play approximately seven interac-
tions to familiarize themselves with it.
We then made the students play for cash rewards. Cash rewards
were given out anonymously. In two classes, the students played
the relatively local competition session first and then the relatively
global competition session second. In the other two classes, the stu-
dents played the relatively global competition session first. For each
class, we did the following. Within each group of three students,
each student played each other for one game. Each game was for
an average of seven repeated interactions of the PD, with the num-
ber of interactions unknown to the students (who were only told that
there was an equal likelihood of the game finishing after each inter-
action). For each interaction, both players made their decisions
simultaneously, without knowledge of the other’s decision. After
each interaction, the students were told the strategy that they had
each chosen, and the points pay off, before the next interaction.We varied the scale of competition by how cash prizes were
awarded. The details of the cash rewards were given to the students
at the start of each session (global or local). For relatively global
competition, the five students in the class who scored the most
points won £10 (top four students in the class with 12 students).
For relatively local competition, the top score in each of the five (or
four) groups of three students won £10. This procedure meant that
the total amount awarded was the same for both local and global
competition. An equally valid way of conceptualizing this is by con-
sidering within and between group competition: within group com-
petition is relatively greater with local competition.
Our aim with this experiment was to test whether individuals ad-
justed their level of cooperation in response to the scale of com-
petition. We tested for this by comparing the average proportion
of interactions in which they cooperated, when playing the same
two players, with relatively local and global competition. Data were
arcsin square root transformed prior to analysis to remove the prob-
lem of nonnormal errors that can arise with proportion data. It can be
argued that the results from the three individuals in the same group
are not independent, because they arise from the same games. Con-
sequently, we examined the robustness of results by analyzing our
data at a number of levels: individuals (n = 57), groups (n = 9), and
classes (n = 4). We calculated the proportion of times the individual
(or group or class) cooperated (arcsin square root transformed) with
relatively global competition minus the proportion of times the indi-
vidual (or group or class) cooperated with relatively local competi-
tion. These values were then tested against the null hypothesis
that the average value did not differ significantly from zero (i.e., there
was no difference in the likelihood of cooperation between relatively
local and relatively global competition) with a t test. All analyses
were carried out with the package GLMStat 6.0 (http://www.
glmstat.com). By comparing the incidence of cooperation in the rel-
atively local and global games, we provide a qualitative test of our
theory.
Cooperation in humans has been much investigated, and the im-
portance of a range of other factors has been demonstrated, includ-
ing sanctions, image scoring, and indirect reciprocity [4–7, 36, 39,
41–44]. In our experiment, the students were split by boards when
playing the game and were not allowed to talk or signal at any point.
Despite this, we cannot eliminate the possibility that their behavior
was influenced by prior knowledge of each other, such as image
scoring. However, this would only influence the average level of co-
operation between players, at both local and global competition,
and so does not alter our ability to test for differences between these
two experimental treatments. A possible influence of time or experi-
ence (number of games played) was controlled for by making the
students play local first in two classes and global first in two classes.
Our results therefore show that when all else is equal, variation in the
scale of competition leads to different levels of cooperation, sug-
gesting that the importance of these other factors will be mediated
by the scale of competition.
Supplemental Data
Supplemental Data include Supplemental Results and Experimental
Procedures and can be found with this article online at http://www.
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